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After the Arab Spring

Review Essay: After the Arab Spring
W. Andrew Terrill

I

n a speech delivered on 19 May 2011, President Obama identified
the following US “core interests” in the Middle East: (1) “countering terrorism,” (2) “stopping the spread of nuclear weapons,” (3)
“securing the free flow of commerce and safeguarding the security of
the region,” and, (4) “standing up for Israel’s security and pursuing ArabIsraeli peace.”1 The US military and intelligence presence in this region
are designed to support these objectives and to reassure US allies while
deterring potential adversaries such as Iran. Currently, it is not clear if the
changes brought about by the Arab Spring uprisings will require the US
military to find new ways to protect these interests or what adjustments
to US basing and other military activity may be required. The ongoing
civil war in Syria and the still unfolding political results in Arab nations
that have successfully overthrown the despots that once ruled them add
to the uncertainty. Understanding the development and evolution of
the Arab Spring is, therefore, an important prerequisite for addressing
some key aspects involving future US national security requirements.
Fortunately, there are a number of excellent works on the subject that
can be useful for US Army professionals and others seeking to do so.
In examining these books, this essay seeks to help address an
ongoing concern of US Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno,
who in March 2012 stated, “We have learned many lessons over the
last 10 years, but one of the most compelling is that—whether you are
working among citizens of a country, or working with their governments
or Armed Forces—nothing is as important to your long term success as
understanding the prevailing culture and values.”2 Tremendous insight
into these cultural issues and values can be gained by examining the
history, and especially the recent history, of the countries we view as
partners and also those we view as potential adversaries. At this time, it is
particularly important to consider the goals and aspirations of the Arab
publics that participated in the Arab Spring and to find ways in which the
US national interest can be advanced while respecting the concerns and
values of Arab populations. To be engaged partners, US Army personnel
must be informed partners, and the Arab uprisings are perhaps the most
important set of events to occur in this region since at least the June
1967 Arab-Israeli war. Moreover, a strong understanding of the regional
trends will help US Army leaders provide valuable and relevant advice to
the civilian leadership on when and how the use of landpower options is
a reasonable idea and when it may be especially problematic.

1     Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and
North Africa,” May 19, 2011, www.whitehouse.gov.
2     General Ray Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, “Regionally Aligned Force: A New Model
for Building Partnerships,” Army Live: Official Blog of the United States Army, March 22, 2012.
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How the Arab Uprisings Developed,
Succeeded, and Sometimes Failed

One of the most important studies
addressing recent events in the Middle
East is The Arab Uprising by Marc Lynch.
This work presents an interesting and
insightful overview of the Arab uprisings which began in Tunisia in December
2010 and spread to a number of other
Arab states. Lynch examines the origins
and development of these uprisings with
special attention given to how the actions
in various countries influenced other Arab
states. Lynch views the Arab uprisings
beginning with Tunisia as part of a process
New York: PublicAffairs, 2012. 289 pages.
evolving regionwide and defines the Arab
$15.99.
Spring as the span of time in which that
process began and moved forward. While Lynch speaks of a unified
narrative among protestors, he does not overgeneralize and is careful to
highlight the differences among the numerous countries involved with
the Arab uprisings. As an expert in Arab media, Lynch also examines
the ways citizens were able to access information and coordinate protest
activities. In doing this, he avoids the trap of viewing these struggles
as the result of social media, which he instead treats as an enabling
technology. In examining the role of technology, he remains alert to the
possibility that activists using social media may not be good representatives of the mainstream of their societies. Lynch is also attentive to the
importance of the Pan-Arab media, with a special focus on the role of
the Qatari-based al Jazeera television station in influencing the events of
the Arab uprisings.
Lynch maintains the main reason people came out to demonstrate
in authoritarian Arab countries after the Tunisian revolution was a
newfound belief their actions could actually make a difference as had
occurred in Tunisia. Other Arab publics were stunned when a 23-yearold police state was defeated in less than a month by an enraged public,
and the Tunisian example strongly indicated such success was possible
elsewhere. Lynch also notes improved communications and new sources
of information frequently allowed the public of one state to identify
with and applaud the actions of protestors in other states confronting
and seeking to oust undemocratic regimes. Here the role of al Jazeera
television appears to have been especially important. Al Jazeera’s talk
show guests overwhelmingly sympathized with the revolutionaries, and
the station characterized the fall of Tunisia’s Ben Ali as an “unmitigated good.” As the effect of the Tunisia uprising became apparent, the
increasingly worried Egyptian government jammed al Jazeera’s signal,
but the news of the Tunisian revolution was too big and exciting to
minimize. Moreover, the Egyptian public had a number of pent-up
grievances now moving to the fore including decades of corruption and
repression. Lynch notes the fait accompli of the president’s son Gamal
Mubarak’s expected succession to the presidency helped “galvanize
unusual levels of popular outrage,” since Gamal was broadly viewed as
an unacceptable choice to lead the country.
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Lynch also examines the importance of the US military role in maintaining “near-constant” dialogue with the Egyptian army, pressing it not
to fire on unarmed demonstrators. This dialogue reinforced the army’s
self-image as the protector of Egypt’s citizens rather than its oppressor.
This viewpoint was already deeply ingrained since the Egyptian military
is composed of a largely depoliticized professional officer corps, indoctrinated to help minimize the danger of a military coup. Correspondingly,
and following the Tunisian example, the Egyptian military remained
unwilling to move outside its traditional role to help the Mubarak regime
survive. This restraint encouraged Egyptian demonstrators to act more
assertively in demanding the end of the regime, sometimes using the
slogan, “the army and the people are one hand.” Without military
backing, Mubarak had only the hated security police and various paid
thugs between his regime and the popular will. This situation led to the
fall of his government in January 2011. While at least 840 protestors were
killed in the Egyptian revolution, this number could have been much
higher had the army backed the president, and the regime may then have
limped along until a more radical solution was undertaken.
Lynch moves on to what he refers to as “the second phase of the
Arab uprising.” This phase followed the quick and relatively easy ousters
of long-standing dictators in Tunisia and Egypt. This new environment
included much tougher problems faced by protestors including grinding struggles with security forces and failures to overturn unpopular
governments. Some protest movements faded quickly due to government suppression. Others, in places like Bahrain and Yemen, became
protracted struggles which sometimes appeared as stalemates in which
the security forces and sometimes the army emerged as tough adversaries against revolutionary forces. States with access to wealth also fared
differently. Oman, for example, experienced the largest demonstrations
of its modern history but was able to calm the situation with the aid of
money provided by the richest of the Gulf Arab states.
The third phase of the uprising began in March 2011, a point in
time Lynch identifies as a high point of counterrevolution and the use of
force. He considers Saudi Arabia as an important leader of the counterrevolution, although he also indicates that the scope and extent of this
leadership has often been exaggerated. He further designates two March
2011 events as key pivot points from the second to the third phase of the
Arab uprisings. These are the Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain
and the beginning of NATO operations against regime forces in Libya.
Also in March 2011, Yemeni President Saleh sharply escalated violence
against demonstrators seeking his ouster. This brutality was so severe
it led to the fragmentation of Yemen’s army into pro-Saleh and prodemonstrator camps that deployed against each other and occasionally
engaged in armed skirmishing with casualties on both sides. In this
stalemated environment, Yemen’s president Ali Abdullah Saleh was
able to remain in office until early 2012 despite a prolonged struggle to
remove him. Also in March 2011, the Syrian uprising began to catch fire
in response to especially horrific regime bloodshed including violence
directed at children in the southern town of Deraa.
Lynch calls Bahrain “the first great battlefield of counterrevolution.” He solidly identifies with the demonstrators and is aghast at the
repressive measures employed by the Bahraini government and its Gulf
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allies. Although generally pleased with the Obama administration’s
polices toward the Arab uprisings, he is unsparing in his criticism of US
policy toward the Bahrain struggle. Yet, this anger is not solely directed
against US policy. He also states that al Jazeera surrendered its previously
heroic Arab Spring role by ignoring the Bahraini intervention in apparent response to the foreign policy priorities of the Qatari government,
which views Bahrain as an ally. He calls the security campaign against
Bahraini demonstrators the first clear cut victory for repression in the
course of the Arab uprisings. Lynch does acknowledge that many Sunni
Bahrainis truly believe the demonstrations were part of a larger Iranian
plot, although he considers such beliefs totally unfounded. Turning to
Libya, Lynch is more upbeat. He praises the remarkable Arab League
consensus in favor of Western military intervention to help the Libyan
people. He also states that the mostly united Arab opposition to the
Syrian regime’s brutal crackdown indicates a new norm whereby regimes
would lose their region-wide legitimacy when they pushed forward to an
unacceptable level of domestic violence.
Lynch comments extensively on US foreign policy in the Middle
East throughout the work and especially at the end. Unsurprisingly, he
sees strong reasons to avoid Americanizing Middle East problems with
military interventions in pursuit of unclear goals. He does, however, see
an occasional need for force and strongly agrees with the US-supported
NATO intervention in Libya. In considering Libya, Lynch presents a
strong case that intervention represented a low- cost/low-risk decision
to prevent a bloodbath in Benghazi with virtually no down side. He is
particularly unsparing of leftist critics of the Libyan intervention, whom
he views as so hopelessly mired in anti-imperialist ideology they can
no longer make the easy choice to avert a massacre at almost no cost.
Conversely, Lynch also asserts that a quick US response to the Syrian
uprising would have been “propaganda gold” for the Assad regime in its
effort to blame the uprising on an American-Israeli plot. Indeed, strong
US relations with Israel, which Lynch does not disagree with, would make
it devilishly difficult for the United States to become deeply involved in
Syria without appearing to be doing so on behalf of a larger pro-Israeli
agenda. Without this intervention, Assad’s efforts to blame foreign plots
for the uprising have largely and correctly been dismissed as propaganda.
Consequently, if Lynch has any disagreement with the Obama
administration it is not over Syria or Libya. He asserts the United States
acted with reasonable speed and agility on giving support to Egyptian
demonstrators seeking the fall of Mubarak (in a view that sometimes contrasts with the assertions of the Egyptian activists who maintain Obama
was too slow). Rather, as noted, Lynch takes the strongest exception to
the Obama administration’s policy over Bahrain, which he often returns
to throughout the book. Still, one wonders how strongly the United
States should have asserted itself on this issue since Bahrain has less than
a million citizens, and it is at least possible that many of the protestors’
grievances might be partially addressed by aggressive antipoverty measures should the wealthy Arab states wisely choose to provide money for
such projects. Furthermore, if the United States had a complete break
with Bahrain, it would only lead to Manama’s almost total dependence
on Saudi Arabia, which would hardly improve the human rights situation there. Nevertheless, Lynch addresses objections such as these by
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asserting that the United States’ unwillingness to denounce the March
intervention badly damaged its regional credibility by establishing a
double standard for the actions of allied states as opposed to states such
as Syria and Libya. Lynch is also worried about the changing narrative
from populations struggling for freedom to sectarian populations fighting each other. Indeed, this problem already seems to be intensifying in
Bahrain, Syria, and potentially Iraq.

The Arab Uprisings in Context
and Aftermath

An excellent companion volume for the
Lynch work is Adeed Dawisha’s The Second
Arab Awakening, which is the newest of the
books considered in this essay. In this work,
the author adds considerable perspective on
how the Arab uprisings unfolded by placing
them in a larger context beginning with the
rise of Arab nationalist regimes in the 1950s
and 1960s. He makes a case that many of
these earlier regimes and their leaders started
out well in efforts to address problems of
social and economic justice, making strides
in education, fighting illiteracy, and helping New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
impoverished citizens improve their pros- 2013. 288 pages. $26.95.
pects for a better life. Yet these regimes also
contained a tragic flaw because they were unwilling to open up the political
system in any meaningful way. This lack of freedom festered in the Arab
political psyche and became more troubling as once-promising nationalist regimes became increasingly self-serving, less interested in social and
educational progress, and more grandiose, incompetent, and reckless
in their decisionmaking. Regimes that had never been free managed to
plunge their citizenry into deepening poverty and unmerciful exploitation
by government officials, thereby undermining any social or economic justifications for continuing the dictatorships. As regime legitimacy declined,
repression and public alienation in these states correspondingly increased,
and some leaders, including Saddam Hussein and Hafez and Bashar Assad,
descended into barbarism.
The Arab uprisings were one potential response to increasingly
intolerable conditions in many states. Nevertheless, important as these
uprisings have been, they are not universal in the Arab World, and some
governments (particularly monarchies) may still be able to reform sufficiently or at least provide a decent enough life for their citizens to accept
their continued rule. In considering the future, Dawisha also provides
comprehensive analysis of the aftermath of the ouster of the Mubarak
and Ben Ali regimes and the ways in which these countries have evolved
since the end of their dictatorships including their potential for success.
The electoral process in Tunisia including the role of political parties,
campaigns, and voting outcomes are scrupulously analyzed with special
emphasis on how the Islamist Ennahdha party was able to connect with
the voters using a number of tactics including promises of moderation.
Turning to Egypt, Dawisha examines a number of instances of conflict
and confrontation between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
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(SCAF) and the activists who originally challenged the Mubarak regime.
He then considers Egypt’s elections which were characterized by the
almost complete marginalization of the activists who led the uprising.
Young people who brilliantly organized protests showed no interest
in acting as political operatives contesting elections until much too
late in the game. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, by contrast, built on
years of organizational skills and long-standing relationships with key
segments of the public, won both the parliamentary and presidential
elections. Moreover, hard-line Islamists, known as salafis, finished in a
strong second place in the race for parliament in a complicating factor
for liberal policies and perhaps economic recovery.
Dawisha also considers Yemen and Libya where uprisings occurred,
but the strongman was able to retain power for some time before he
was ousted. Dawisha has strong praise for the Libyan opposition leaders
who led the effort against the Qadhafi dictatorship and were able to
assemble a coherent opposition leadership structure in the Transitional
National Council (TNC). The TNC was able to coordinate the political, economic, and military support revolutionary forces received from
a number of countries and present a reasonable and mature face of
the Libyan Revolution to the outside world. Dawisha also agrees with
Lynch that without NATO intervention, the revolution would have been
crushed by heavily-armed government forces in a bloodbath directed
against anti-Qadhafi rebels and probably anyone else in areas controlled
by anti-government forces. As the war turned around, Qadhafi broadcast increasingly hysterical radio rants that could hardly have bolstered
the morale of his supporters. When his forces were defeated and he
was summarily killed, the TNC then faced the challenge of organizing
a government in a country with at least 40 large and powerful militias
that had participated in the destruction of the old regime but were not
usually willing to give up much of their power. Under these conditions,
and without any strong government institutions, Libya had an urgent
need for elections to fortify a new national government. When these
elections occurred, the Islamists did surprisingly poorly. While huge
problems with order and stability remain in Libya, Dawisha suggests
that its small population, great wealth, and commitment to “finishing
the job properly,” may give Libya at least some chance of becoming a
peaceful, prosperous state.
Dawisha further indicates Yemen faces tremendous problems as it
recovers from a president who remained in power for 33 years without
doing much for the country. Throughout his time in office, President
Saleh engaged in both force and extensive political maneuvering to stay
in power, although he was ultimately unable to do so. Unfortunately,
Yemen could not easily afford the final power struggle, which lasted
for over a year and ravaged the already weak economy. Yemen now
faces both deepening poverty and intensified regional tension between
the central government and the northern and southern regions of the
country. It will, correspondingly, need intense international help to
remain a politically viable state.
While Yemen’s revolutionaries eventually removed that country’s
strongman from office, other examples Dawisha considers in this work
include countries where uprisings occurred but were either co-opted,
crushed, or fizzled out. Like Lynch, Dawisha worries that the Bahraini
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crackdown has deeply discredited Shi’ite moderates who had been able
to work with the king, making reconciliation appear as a distant dream.
He also quotes the fact-finding commission led by American international lawyer and scholar Cherif Bassiouni that there was no compelling
evidence linking Iran to the unrest in Bahrain. Dawisha, like Lynch,
nevertheless notes that Bahraini Sunnis are convinced of this link. He
shows little optimism for Bahrain predicting that the schisms there will
become even deeper and more entrenched without intense and serious
attention to Shi’ite grievances.
Dawisha is also deeply concerned about Syria, where civil war has
now been raging for over 2 years. This portion of the book is not pleasant reading due to his vivid description of the measures the regime has
taken to remain in power. Dawisha notes that Assad, like Qadhafi, has
no compunction about butchering his own people. Unlike Qadhafi, he
also has the means to do so on a much larger scale. Dawisha quotes
a number of witnesses to the fighting who make some truly chilling
statements. One Western reporter smuggled into the country is quoted
as saying, “There are no targets. It’s a pure systematic slaughter of a
civilian population.” Other witnesses include medical professionals
from international organizations and “citizen journalists” who have sent
reports of their plight often with video footage to the outside world.
Dawisha describes the plight of the destruction of the Homs neighborhood of Baba Amr as particularly poignant. Baba Amr was considered
an important rebel stronghold by the Assad regime, which singled it
out for special punishment with intense shelling and bombing followed
by house to house advances by government troops in which thousands
of civilians were slaughtered. Baba Amr had a population of around
50,000 people before the rebellion, but it was reduced to a depopulated
wasteland by these regime actions.
Turning to the governments that have survived the Arab Spring,
Dawisha maintains the monarchies of both Morocco and Jordan had
enough legitimacy to convince significant portions of their publics that
these systems can be reformed from within. Dawisha has some particularly interesting insights on Morocco where the reasonably popular King
Mohammad VI managed to preempt a revolution by undertaking what at
least for now appears to be promising change. In Jordan, similar efforts
to open the political system are also occurring, although they are less
dramatic and more gradual. Dawisha also discusses Lebanon and Iraq.
He suggests that the Iraqi public has shown increasing political maturity
over time in a series of elections. In particular, Dawisha maintains many
Iraqis want a more nonsectarian government and have been moving
toward less divisive candidates in successive elections. Unfortunately, he
cannot be optimistic about Iraq due to the polarizing and increasingly
authoritarian government of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki as well as the
development of a timid and ineffectual parliament. Dawish also notes
the Lebanese political system, despite numerous shortcomings, is far
from the suffocating authoritarianism found in many other Arab states.
He states all of Lebanon’s major political factions and parties, including
Hezbollah, are struggling to prevent the Syrian civil war from spilling
over into Lebanon.
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Chief Losers of the Arab Spring: The
Arab Presidents for Life
In another useful book, Harvard’s Roger
Owen considers the Arab uprisings by
dissecting the types of regime challenged, and in some cases overthrown,
in the Arab Spring. It is hardly secret
that the Arab world has historically been
filled with undemocratic governments,
but Owen highlights subtle changes in
how these dictatorships have organized
themselves over time. In the post-World
War II era, monarchs and revolutionary
autocrats dominated the region, although
Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
the strategies for maintaining these
2012. 248 pages. $24.95.
regimes in power were continuously
adjusted through trial and error. Many of
these early “republics” were established by military coups, and they
remained vulnerable to being overthrown by new cliques of ambitious
officers leading some Arab states to become chronically unstable and
coup-ridden. This system eventually changed with new and often more
powerful strongmen and with the development of what Owen calls the
Arab “presidential security regime,” which came to dominate a number
of Arab states and carry the process of nonmonarchical autocracy to a
new level of presidential dominance. Owen traces the history of how
these systems of military autocrats evolved into presidential security
regimes by considering the examples of a number of Arab countries
that have developed largely coup-proof regimes. Various dictators
have accomplished this through tools such as parallel armed forces,
multiple and competing internal security forces, sham elections, and
expanded cults of personality, which in more recent times can include
the leader’s family. Once Arab rulers have foreclosed the possibility of
losing power to a new coup by rising military officers, the temptation
to establish oneself as president for life often seems irresistible.
Owen also states that Arab leaders have learned from each other’s
systems of regime maintenance causing monarchies to borrow the legitimizing institutions of the revolutionary republics such as weak or even
rubber-stamp parliaments. Also, over time, the self-described republican
states have in many instances acquired key elements of monarchy. Two
of the monarchical features that are most interesting to the presidents
for life have been: (1) the establishment of a ruling dynasty, and (2) the
previously noted expectation that the president will rule as long as he
is physically able to do so. The concept of a republican president for
life who then passes power to a favored son while viewing neighboring
monarchies with condescension clearly seems a bit odd. It took considerable time to reach this point since some strong Arab presidents retained
at least the vestiges of republican principles for years after taking power.
Many powerful Arab strongmen, such as Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and
Tunisia’s Habib Bourguiba, probably expected to hold office indefinitely,
but these leaders never seemed to have considered their sons might
succeed them. More recently, emulating key aspects of the monarchies
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has often been poorly received by the public of these states, which often
consider themselves to be part of more politically developed systems.
Yet, on the eve of the Arab uprisings, father/son succession had already
occurred in Syria and seemed to have been planned or at least considered
by the presidents of Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Saddam Hussein also
seemed intent on having his younger son Qusay eventually succeed him,
but any steps in this direction became moot when he was removed from
power by the US-led invasion in 2003. Some presidents for life who do
not have sons who could succeed them have turned to other relatives. In
Algeria, President Abdulaziz Bouteflika’s younger brother was, at least
for awhile, the front-runner to take power when the current president
leaves office. In Tunisia, former president Ben Ali’s son-in-law seemed
to be carving out a role as heir apparent until the events of 2010-2011
swept the regime away.
Owen also contrasts the presidential security regimes with other
systems of government in the Middle East. In doing this, he suggests
reasons why Lebanon and post-Saddam Iraq have not developed presidents for life. He maintains that, in these cases, there is a diffusion of
influence throughout their respective political systems that makes it difficult for a president to accumulate the kind of authority found in security
regimes. This analysis clearly has relevance for Lebanon, although in the
case of Iraq one needs to be more careful about drawing premature conclusions concerning the still-evolving political systems there. Turning to
the monarchies, he suggests some of these states have adopted features
of the presidential security regime beyond simply maintaining a king
who is the functional equivalent of a president for life, albeit with a more
straightforward form of legitimacy and none of the staggering level
of hypocrisy of the presidential security regimes. Still, Owen stresses
monarchical legitimacy is often too weak to guarantee the survival of any
government without strong security institutions as well. Other regime
maintenance strategies borrowed from the republics included managed
elections for those countries with elected parliaments and large and
powerful domestic security establishments. One cannot help noticing
that, whatever their shortcomings, the Arab monarchs have done a much
better job of maintaining themselves in power than the presidents for
life. The Bahraini monarchy came the closest to collapse, but its fortunes
dramatically changed following Saudi-led military intervention.
Owen contends the Middle Eastern uprisings have now largely
ended the era of the Arab presidents for life, with only Syria having
a limited chance of maintaining such a system. He maintains the era
ended with “an almost complete rejection of this form of semimonarchical government” by “populations no longer able to stomach either
the personal sense of humiliation this method of rule involved or the
way in which it alienated them from their fellow citizens.” Owen, like
Dawisha, strongly asserts the systems of Arab presidents for life did
little to compensate people for their existence under brutal repression.
No sterling economic achievements stand to justify the leader’s time in
office in any of these countries. Corruption flourishes, unemployment,
and especially youth unemployment, are astronomical, and collapsing or
underfunded educational systems challenge the future leaders of these
states. The ugly legacy of the presidents for life, therefore, remain for
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future governments to address in what can only be seen as a herculean
struggle where a positive outcome is by no means guaranteed.

The Ongoing Nightmare in Syria

Moving from the entire region to an
extremely important case study, longtime
Syria watcher, David Lesch has made a
valuable contribution to the literature on
the Arab uprisings by examining what
is probably the most heartbreaking and
complicated country experiencing serious
unrest and fighting. Unlike the relatively
easy victories in Tunisia and Egypt, the
struggle to rid Syria of its dictator has been
long, miserable, and incredibly bloody. In
late 2010 and early 2011, both the Damascus
government and most informed observers
considered Syria to be a stable country and
New Haven and London: Yale University
unlikely to experience significant upheaval.
Press. 275 pages. $28.00.
Syrian officials arrogantly stated that the
Arab Spring found fertile ground in Egypt
and Tunisia due to their governments’ subservient relationship to the
United States, their unwillingness to provide significant support to the
Palestinians, and their rule by elderly, out-of-touch autocrats in contrast
to the much younger Bashar. Left unstated was the repressive apparatus
of the Syrian state which was significantly more brutal, comprehensive,
and intimidating than those of Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, or even Libya.
When the Arab Spring revolts first broke out, Assad felt comfortable
enough with the situation to praise the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt
in the comfortable belief that they had no implications for his regime.
Then things changed in ways the regime’s leadership never expected.
Lesch has met with Bashar Assad on numerous occasions prior to
the civil war as part of his ongoing research into Syrian politics. Partially
based on this experience, Lesch maintains it “is almost certain that
Bashar al-Assad was absolutely shocked when the uprisings in the Arab
world started to seep into his country in March 2011” after earlier Syrian
demonstrators had failed to gather any kind of critical mass of supporters in January and February. In a country with 70,000 security officials,
and a program of systemically applying intimidation and preemptive
fear, this seemed unbelievable. In asking how this could happen, Leach
explores the theme of citizens coping with arbitrary repression on
a daily basis and presents a portrait of a police state where unflinching oppression is both casual and reflexive. Lesch notes that Syrians
have consistently been forced to swallow the brutality of the regime,
but sometimes a line is crossed and outrage gushes forth. Just such a
transgression occurred in the southern city of Deraa when a number of
school children were apprehended by security forces for writing antiregime graffiti on various buildings. These children, possibly including
some as young as 9, were beaten, imprisoned, and reportedly tortured for
an offense any humane political system would have treated as childish
mischief. Spontaneous demonstrations occurred over the brutalization
of the Deraa school children with Syrian authorities responding with
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virtually automatic violence as the crisis escalated and protests spread
to other parts of the country. The Syrian leadership was caught offguard by the rapidly increasing intensity of the protests and continued
to make a police and military solution the centerpiece of the government
response. Later, as it became clear that peaceful opposition could not
defeat the Syrian regime, an armed opposition emerged, which obtained
weapons wherever it could.
Assad’s violent response to the initially peaceful uprising was characteristic of his regime. Afraid any loosening on the reins of power would
lead to the beginning of a process of ending the political dominance of
his minority Alawite sect, the president was prepared to offer little in the
way of actual democratic reform. Instead, he offered cosmetic changes
and endless propaganda about foreign hands guiding the opposition.
Regarding foreign plots, Bashar is quoted as saying, “They will say that
we believe in the conspiracy theory. In fact there is no conspiracy theory.
There is a conspiracy.” The alleged conspiracy was supposed to involve
an effort to weaken and dismember Syria because it is “the last obstacle
facing the Israeli plans.” Such talk clearly indicated the regime’s unwillingness to seek any kind of meaningful compromise and instead engage
in an effort to demonize the opposition. Indeed, Lesch suggests the
Syrian leadership may have believed the confused and vacillating efforts
to compromise with the opposition led to the fall of the Tunisian and
Egyptian regimes by showing weakness when resolve was needed.
Lesch also makes a number of important points about the resilience
of the Syrian regime and the Syrian dictator’s drive to stay in power
seemingly at all costs. He states that Bashar has evolved into a much
more confident and cynical leader over his almost eleven years in office
prior to the outbreak of civil war. While Bashar was initially surrounded
by powerful old-guard ministers when he took office in 2000, by 2011
his authority had been completely established. Lesch also notes that,
“the Assads have skillfully played the minority card over the years” and
in doing so have usually been able to guarantee at least a 20-30 percent
loyal base of regime supporters. In this regard, it would surprise no one
the Alawite community is largely in Assad’s camp, but other minorities
have some difficult choices in assessing what kind of government will
best serve their interests. The Assads have been aware of these concerns
and are portrayed by Lesch as reaching out to Syria’s Druze and Kurdish
communities in an effort to generate more internal support. More importantly in terms of numbers, the regime has consistently manipulated the
insecurities of the over 2 million Syrian Christians about their possible
future under a Sunni-dominated or perhaps even Islamist government.
Although the Syrian regime has usually been skillful in such efforts, one
has to wonder how much manipulation is really necessary after the terror
unleashed against Iraq’s Christians following the ouster of Saddam
Hussein. The rise of the al Qaeda affiliated al Nusra Front within the
Syrian opposition occurred after this book was published but certainly
stands as another key factor terrifying Syria’s Christians.
Lesch notes the Syrian regime’s excessive and reflexive use of violence squandered opportunities to damp down the unrest. He also
discusses the nature and development of the opposition including the
local activists who have often worked within the framework of Local
Coordination Committees. He notes that these local activists have made
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considerable use of social media and the internet just as their counterparts did in Tunisia and Egypt. This activity has caused the regime
to respond by creating a special unit of computer experts called the
Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). Other sources are less certain the SEA
is actually controlled by the regime, though all sources understand it is
virulently pro-Assad.3 Lesch, however, is almost certainly correct in that
a centralized regime such as the one in Syria would seek to maintain
direct control over its propaganda message. Moreover, the role of the
Internet in the Arab Spring has been so prominent it seems impossible
Assad (a self-described computer enthusiast) would delegate his strategy for defeating the online protesters to a band of loosely affiliated
well-wishers.
Lesch also expertly delineates a number of compelling reasons to
expect the Syrian regime will resist a future diplomatic settlement. These
reasons include Assad’s concern that a number of his closest collaborators, including his pitiless younger brother, Maher, may be subjected
to revolutionary justice even if he escapes it. Basher appears to believe
he has a good chance of outlasting the opposition. The Syrian leader
appears doubtful the United States and other Western powers will intervene in Syria with ground troops given the recent US experience in Iraq.
Lesch suggests a key factor inhibiting Western intervention is the cost of
rebuilding Syria, which will probably be greater than the cost of rebuilding Iraq since at least Iraq has substantial oil reserves. Additionally, this
scenario for rebuilding assumes the civil war will actually end with the
defeat of the regime, which Lesch acknowledges is by no means certain
since the opposition is deeply divided and may be unable to maintain
even a fragile unity once the regime is no longer a threat. Lesch thus
describes an escalating conflict that has continued to escalate since
the publication of his book. Bashar remains unwilling to make serious
reform or to take steps toward actual power sharing. The regime will
either fall or prevail, but it does not appear it will compromise. Given
this situation, one hopes an updated edition of this book will be possible since the situation in Syria is changing rapidly and Lesch’s insights
will continue to be of tremendous value, including after the regime’s
probable fall.

Conclusion

The full meaning of the Arab Spring is still unfolding. The complexity of the problems that exist in this part of the world defy easy
solutions, but there are times when US involvement can play an important role in helping friendly states without Americanizing their conflicts.
The professionalism shown by the Tunisian and Egyptian armies during
peak times of crisis was clearly encouraged by their longstanding relationship with the US military as well as their willingness to listen to US
Army officers who spoke to them as friends during the upheaval. It is
also interesting that some Arab sensitivities about cooperation with the
West can be set aside briefly in a time of crisis such as when the Arab
League supported the establishment of a NATO-enforced no-fly zone
in Libya. Such action should not be taken as a green light for all sorts of
interventions, but it does indicate more potential for expanded US Army
3     Sarah Fowler, “Who is the Syrian Electronic Army?” BBC News, April 25, 2013. www.
bbc.c.o.uk/world/news-middle-east, accessed April 25, 2013.
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activities in some countries in times of urgent need. The current deployment of US Special Forces units and some headquarters personnel from
the 1st Armored Division to Jordan to help prevent a widening of the
Syrian civil war may be a useful example of how to support a regional
ally. On a more limited scale, the US Army’s efforts to help reorganize
and train some units of the Yemeni army are clearly useful in supporting
the country’s efforts to recover from the scars of President Ali Abdullah
Saleh’s 33-year rule.
All the books reviewed reveal the grinding attrition of the Syrian
civil war, which is now in its third year. No feeling person can be without
sympathy for the Syrian population, but increasing US involvement in
this crisis could be foolhardy if good intentions are allowed to wish
away the a full consideration of the potential problems of such action.
President Assad has been unyielding in his insistence that the uprising
against him is the result of foreign powers acting in the interests of
the Israelis. While such assertions are absurd, this does not mean they
cannot gain traction should the United States widen its involvement in
ways that include ground troops. These propaganda tools will almost
certainly not be confined to the Assad government but could also be
taken up by Syrian Islamist radicals in the struggle for control in postAssad Syria. Such reasoning is one indication that ground troops should
be used in Syria under only the more dire circumstances and in ways that
will not cause them to become bogged down so withdrawal is difficult
later. The United States especially does not want to become an occupation force in such circumstances.
Above all, the Arab Spring and its aftermath should be viewed as a
time of tremendous transition in the Middle East, where well-informed
US Army leaders may be called upon to find ways to help friendly forces
in useful and creative ways. In doing so, the US Army should seek to
provide helpful options to the US civilian leadership in ways that offer
reasonable rewards for wise rather than massive commitments.

